[B]
AFFAIRS OF CHINA.
15537
20
IRE 2 MAY 07
[April 20.]
SECTION 1.
CONFIDENTIAL.
(12732]
No. 1.
Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.-(Received April 20.)
(No. 101.) Sir,
Peking, February 28, 1907. IN my despatch No. 99, Confidential, of the 21st instant, I commented on the appointment of Feng Shan as General-in-chief of the four divisions of the army recently withdrawn from the control of Viceroy Yuan, and upon the tendency of the Court to place increased power in the hands of the Manchus.
I have the honour now to inclose an extract from the last Hankow Intelligence Report, in which this question is examined by a writer in a popular periodical. As the article points out, all posts in the Empire are, by the recent Reform Decree, nominally thrown open to Manchus and Chinese alike, but, in reality, the Manchus hold a predominant position in the actual government of the country. They practically control the army, the finances, and the educational policy of the Empire, and four of the seven Viceroys are Manchus.
On the other hand, the Resident in Thibet, who was formerly always a Manchu, is now a Chinese, and the Generals of the Banner garrisons at Canton and other provincial centres are now indifferently Chinese or Manchus, These latter appoint- ments are, however, no longer of any importance, and, when given to Chinese, generally fall to members of distinguished families as a reward, not for their own services, but for those of their ancestors. The Marquis Li, for instance, the grandson of Li Hung- chang, who has had no military experience of any kind, is now General of the Manchu troops at Canton.
Whether the anti-Chinese policy of the Court is, as this article makes out, also anti-foreign in its aim, is a question on which it is difficult to express an opinion, but there can be little doubt that the change in the command of the Northern Army is not calculated to inspire confidence. The control has passed from the hands of a Viceroy who ruled his province with a firm hand, and showed a wise conception of his country's interests in 1900, to the Manchu party, whose hesitation and weakness were largely responsible for the disastrous upheaval of that year.
I have, &c.
(Signed)
J. N. JORDAN.
Inclosure in No. 1.
Extract from Hankow Intelligence Report No. 14 of February 23, 1907.
"UNIVERSAL GAZETTE," of the 31st January, 1907, has a leading article on the dangers of President T'ieh's views and policy.
Of all the present statesmen capable of endangering China, none are worse than the high officers who are deeply prejudiced on the Manchu-Chinese question, and more especially he who, imbued with such prejudice, is also in a position to make the Administration a vehicle for furthering his conviction-that is to say, President T'ieh-Liang.
By a recent Peking telegram we had learned that he had asked that Feng-Shan, Commandant of the Peking Banners, should be in supreme command of the troops of the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 6th brigades, and that his advice had been taken. These brigades used to be under Yuan Shih-K'ai, but when the administrative reorganization discussion arose, Yuan asked to be relieved of various important appointments, and so these brigades reverted to the Army Board, of which President Tieh is head. His guiding policy having always been anti-Chinese, critics said he had long looked askance on high Chinese officers being in control of military power, and Yuan's application to be relieved of various duties was due to T'ieh's hostility. I scarcely believed this theory at first, but now that Feng-Shan, who has neither great influence nor any special name,
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